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Open access under CCSense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling one’s own actions, and, through these
actions, events in the outside world. Sense of agency is widely held to involve a retrospec-
tive inference based on matching actual effects of an action with its expected effects. We
hypothesise a second, prospective aspect of sense of agency, reﬂecting the ﬂuency of action
selection, based on results from subliminal priming of actions. When people responded to a
target that was compatible with a preceding subliminal prime, they felt stronger sense of
control over a subsequent colour effect than when the preceding prime was incompatible.
Importantly, compatible and incompatible primes had the same predictive statistical rela-
tion to the colour effect. We next investigated whether differences in sense of control could
be based on monitoring motor performance. By varying the timings of mask and target, we
compared sense of control between a Positive Compatibility condition, where compatible
primes facilitated performance, and a Negative Compatibility condition, where compatible
primes impaired performance. We found that compatible priming again enhanced sense of
control, irrespective of its effects on performance. We present a simple model of the pro-
spective aspect of sense of agency, in which early signals reﬂecting action selection pro-
cessing make a direct, experiential contribution to sense of control. Sense of agency may
be partly based on an experience-based ‘feeling of doing’, analogous to the metacognitive
‘feeling of knowing’.
 2012 Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling one’s
own actions, and, through these actions, events in the out-
side world. Previous research suggested that this subjec-
tive feeling of control depends strongly on predicting
outcomes: sense of agency gets stronger as the match be-
tween predicted and actual action outcomes gets closer
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Farrer et al., 2008;
Linser & Goschke, 2007; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Sato &
Yasuda, 2005; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). For example, ifnitive Neuroscience,
ueen Square, London
1153; fax: +44 (0)20
).
 BY license.I intend to turn on the light by pressing a switch, and the
light comes on after I press the switch, then I am likely
to feel that I caused the light to come on. On this view,
the basic computation underlying sense of agency involves
matching the intended effects of action against its actual
effects (Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002). Interest-
ingly, this computation can only be performed retrospec-
tively, after information about outcomes becomes
available, even though the intention to achieve a given out-
come includes a future-directed component (Pacherie,
2000, 2008). For example, people may monitor whether
their actions produce the effects they expected, and thus
metacognitively infer whether they caused those effects
or not (Miele, Wager, Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011).
An alternative possibility, that sense of agency is partly
generated prospectively, in advance of knowing the actual
outcome of actions, has however received recent support
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this view, selecting between alternative possible actions
might itself generate a sense of agency. For example, faced
with two electrical switches, if I deliberately choose the
lighting switch rather than the heating switch, I may expe-
rience a stronger sense of control than if I hesitate in con-
fusion over which switch to choose. Importantly, this
difference in subjective experience of agency precedes ac-
tion and outcome, and is independent of them. In both
cases described above, I might actually press the lighting
switch, and make the lights come on. Thus, monitoring sig-
nals generated at the point of action selection could contrib-
ute to a sense of agency, independently of objective facts of
action execution and outcome.
In a recent study, Wenke et al. (2010) investigated this
prospective component of control using an experimental
design that dissociated the processes of action selection
from action–outcome matching. They used subliminal
priming to manipulate ﬂuency of selection between left
and right keypresses in response to suprathreshold left-
and right-pointing arrow targets. Subliminal prime arrow
directions were either identical (compatible condition) or
opposite (incompatible condition) to the subsequent target
direction. Each keypress was followed by a colour patch.
One set of colours was shown when prime and target were
compatible, and another set when prime and target were
incompatible. Participants reported a stronger sense of
control over the colour patch when they acted compatibly
with a prime that they could not even see, relative to
incompatibly. Importantly, this effect was not due to pre-
dictability of action outcomes, since the relation between
keypress action and colour outcome was always equally
predictable. Rather, the stronger experience of control
when prime and target were compatible could only be ex-
plained by the ﬂuency of action selection – i.e., by an inter-
nal signal inﬂuenced by the prime–target relation.
Crucially, this ﬂuency-related signal must have been gen-
erated at the action selection stage and sampled before
the action was executed (Wenke et al., 2010). Further,
these primes were subliminal. Therefore, the changes that
they caused in sense of control were unlikely to involve
conscious metacognitive inference (Miele et al., 2011).
Rather, compatible primes might have generated an expe-
rience-based form of metacognition: a ‘feeling of doing’
analogous to the well-studied ‘feeling of knowing’ (Koriat,
2000; Muñoz, 2011).
However, the results are also compatible with a very
different interpretation, which has no need for monitoring
of internal ﬂuency signals. Speciﬁcally, participants might
perceive control based on monitoring of their own motor
performance, for example their response times (RTs). Since
RTs are lower on compatibly- than incompatibly-primed
trials (Dehaene et al., 1998; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000;
Schlaghecken, Rowley, Sembi, Simmons, & Whitcomb,
2007), participants would therefore feel more control on
compatible trials, because they respond more rapidly. On
this second view, agency would depend on retrospective
monitoring of action execution performance (Corallo,
Sackur, Dehaene, & Sigman, 2008; Marti, Sackur, Sigman,
& Dehaene, 2010), not on prospectivemonitoring of premo-
tor ﬂuency signals.To distinguish between these two accounts of sense of
control, we used an experimental procedure that dissoci-
ated ﬂuency of action selection from RTmonitoring. Specif-
ically, we increased the interval between mask and target
(see Fig. 1) to take advantage of a Negative Compatibility
Effect (NCE) in priming. The NCE occurs only at longer
mask–target intervals, and is generally interpreted as an
automatic inhibition of an initially-primed response
(Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003; Klapp & Haas, 2005;
Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002,
2006; Sumner & Husain, 2008; but see Jas´kowski (2008)
for an alternative account of this auto-inhibition process).
If a prime-induced activation is not rapidly conﬁrmed by
a target, then an auto-inhibitory process is thought to sup-
press response activation below baseline, since the primed
action is now shown to be inappropriate (see Fig. 6a, upper
panel). Importantly, the locus of the NCE therefore lies
after the action selection stage.
Thus, compatible priming accelerates RTs at short
mask–target latencies, (PCE), but paradoxically increases
RTs at longer latencies (NCE). By combining this factor with
our previous design for assessing sense of control, we could
directly distinguish between performance monitoring and
action selection accounts. A stronger experience of control
on compatible trials, despite slower response times generated
at NCE latencies, would provide strong evidence for a pro-
spective contribution of action-selection ﬂuency to sense
of control. Alternatively, a stronger experience of control
for faster responses, irrespective of prime compatibility,
would provide evidence that sense of agency depends on
performance monitoring. We tested these two predictions
in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we replicated our ﬁnd-
ings in a new sample of participants, additionally including
trials with neutral primes. We also formally tested
whether participants were conscious of the direction of
primes stimuli.2. Experiment 1
2.1. Material and methods
2.1.1. Participants
Eighteen participants (8 females and 10 males aged 21–
34 years), with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were
recruited to participate in the study. They provided written
informed consent prior to the experiment and were paid
€10 for their participation. The experiment was approved
by the UCL Research Ethics Committee.2.1.2. Apparatus and materials
The visual display was presented on a computer screen
placed at about 60 cm from the participant (display mod-
e = 800  600  32, 60 Hz). The experiment was pro-
grammed and stimulations were delivered using
Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, California,
http://www.neurobs.com).
Primes consisted of grey left- or right-pointing arrows
followed by isoluminant metacontrast masks constructed
by superimposing left- and right-oriented primes (Fig. 1).
The outer shape of the mask was rectangular. The targets
Fig. 1. Experiment 1: Schematic of trial procedure and stimuli. Example trials from the four possible combinations of prime–action compatibility and PCE/
NCE. Participants were instructed to respond to the target stimuli, and were not informed of the presence of the primes. Primes and masks could appear
randomly above or below ﬁxation on each trial. On PCE trials, the mask–target Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA) was 0, with the mask appearing within the
inner cutout of the target. On NCE trials, the mask–target SOA was 110 ms, with the target being presented immediately after the mask disappeared.
Participants were asked to estimate how much control they felt they had over the colour patch that appeared 100, 300, or 500 ms, after their response. AEI:
Action-effect interval.
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left or right, with a cutout large enough for the mask to
ﬁt without touching the inner contours of the target
(Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005). Prime and mask stimuli could
appear randomly above or below ﬁxation to enhance the
masking effect (Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, &
Schwarzbach, 2003). Action outcomes were circular colour
patches of red, green, blue, or yellow. All stimuli appeared
on a grey background.2.1.3. Design and procedure
The task was to respond to the direction of the target ar-
row by pressing the corresponding response button with
the right or left index ﬁnger.
Examples of each (left and right) target were presented
during experimental instruction so that participants would
become acquainted with the target stimuli. No reference
was made to the existence or appearance of the primes.
On half of the trials in each block at random, the prime
and the target (and therefore also the manual response)
were compatible, while on the remaining trials they were
incompatible (see Fig. 1). In addition, trials were randomly
divided into PCE and NCE trials, by inserting (NCE) or
omitting (PCE) a 110 ms delay between mask and target
(Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005).Action effects consisted of coloured circles that ap-
peared on the screen 100, 300 or 500 ms after the response
to the target. This jitter in action-effect delay was intro-
duced because delay strongly inﬂuences sense of control
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Wenke et al., 2010),
and was therefore expected to increase the range of partic-
ipants’ control ratings. Red, green, blue, or yellow colour
patches were presented, according to whether the trial
was prime–target compatible or prime–target incompati-
ble. In each block, two colours (one for each hand) were as-
signed to prime-compatible responses, another two
colours to prime-incompatible responses. Colours were ro-
tated via a Latin square such that, across all four blocks,
each colour appeared in each compatibility condition for
each hand. After the colour patch was displayed, partici-
pants judged how much control they felt they had over
the colour effect by using a scale ranging from 1 (no con-
trol) to 8 (complete control).
When making their judgment, participants were explic-
itly given the instruction to judge the extent to which they
thought they had controlled the appearance of the col-
oured patch through their action. The control judgement
therefore concerned the causal relationship between the
action and the consequent effect, rather than simply the ef-
fect, or simply the action alone. Such control judgements
are a standard way of assessing retrospective agency while
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cesses that are more relevant to ‘‘ownership’’ rather than
to agency (see Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) for
a review). Subjects were not told that they had in fact no
real control over the appearance of the colour effect.2.1.4. Timeline
Each trial began with a central ﬁxation cross which re-
mained visible until the colour-effect stimulus appeared.
The prime was presented for 17 ms, followed by a mask
after an SOA (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony) of 33 ms. Mask
and target durations were both 110 ms. These parameters
were chosen because extensive previous studies showed
that conscious perception of prime direction is impossible
with these exposures (see Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005; Vor-
berg et al., 2003). In particular, the prime–mask asyn-
chrony strongly inﬂuences prime visibility. Vorberg et al.
(2003) found that participants could not report the identity
of the primes at prime–mask SOAs from 14 to 70 ms, even
after extended practice of more than 3000 trials.
Mask–target SOA was varied in order to induce either a
PCE or a NCE, following the same procedure as in Lingnau
and Vorberg (2005). On PCE trials, the mask–target SOA
was 0, with the mask appearing within the inner cutout
of the target. On NCE trials, the mask–target SOA was of
110 ms, with the target being presented immediately after
the mask disappeared. Note that trial events were timed so
that the target stimulus always appeared 700 ms after the
ﬁxation cross, irrespective of the PCE/NCE manipulation
(see Fig. 1).
The response window was set to 1200 ms. If partici-
pants failed to respond within this time window, or made
an incorrect response, they saw a black X instead of a col-
oured circle. The coloured patches representing action ef-
fects remained on the screen for 300 ms. After a jittered
delay (grey background) varying from 1 to 2 s, a rating
scale appeared for 1500 ms, allowing the participant to
judge the level of control she felt over the colour patch.
Once the participant made her control judgment, the rating
scale was replaced by a ﬁxation cross until the end of the
1500 ms response window.
The experiment consisted of four blocks of 64 trials
each. When an error occurred, the corresponding trial
was repeated at the end of each block (up to 10 error trials
per block), ensuring that all colours were seen equally of-
ten despite any errors.Fig. 2. Experiment 1: Mean response times (ms), mean error rates (%),
and mean control ratings, on compatible and incompatible trials, for each
mask–target SOA (PCE/NCE). At NCE latencies, the positive compatibility
effect (PCE) on performance measures is reversed (response times), or
abolished (error rates), so that performance costs now occur on compat-
ible trials and beneﬁts on incompatible trials. However, the relationship
between compatibility and sense of control is similar under PCE and NCE
conditions: participants felt more in control in compatibly-primed than
incompatibly-primed trials, irrespective of how priming affected perfor-
mance. All error bars indicate SEM. : p < .05; : p < .005.2.1.5. Data analyses
Error rates (ERs), response times (RTs) were analysed
independently using 2  2 repeated-measures ANOVAs
with prime–target compatibility (compatible vs. incompat-
ible) andmask–target SOA (PCE vs. NCE) as within-subjects
factors. Control ratings for colour effects were analysed
using a 2  2  3 repeated-measures ANOVA with mask–
target SOA, prime–target compatibility, and action-effect
interval (100, 300, 500 ms) as within-subjects factors.
Post-hoc Fisher tests were used to identify differences be-
tween conditions.2.2. Results
2.2.1. Response times
Our analyses focused on demonstrating PCE and NCE ef-
fects. ANOVA showed no main effects of compatibility
(F(1,17) = 0.14, p = 0.70) or mask–target SOA (F(1,17) =
0.21, p = 0.65). There was a signiﬁcant interaction between
mask–target SOA (i.e., PCE vs. NCE latencies) and prime–
target compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible):
(F(1,17) = 12.36, p = 0.002) (Fig. 2, upper panel). As
expected, on PCE trials, participants’ responses to arrow
targets following compatible primes were faster than
following incompatible primes (post-hoc Fisher test,
p = 0.013). Also as expected, NCE trials reversed the
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slower for compatible than for incompatible trials (post-
hoc Fisher test, p = 0.041) (see also Supplemental material,
‘‘Correlation analyses’’, and Table S2).
2.2.2. Error rates
There was no signiﬁcant main effects of compatibility
(F(1,17) = 0.56, p = 0.46) or mask–target SOA (F(1,17) =
0.002, p = 0.96). The interaction effect between mask–
target SOA and compatibility was signiﬁcant (F(1,17)=
6.34, p = 0.022) (Fig. 2b). On PCE trials, as predicted,
participants made more errors in incompatible than in
compatible trials (post-hoc Fisher test, p = 0.019). On NCE
trials, a numerical effect in the opposite direction was
found, but did not reach signiﬁcance (post-hoc Fisher test,
p = 0.34).
2.2.3. Control ratings
First, we found a main effect of compatibility (F(1,17) =
6.45, p = 0.02). This replicated the effect reported previ-
ously by Wenke et al. (2010), with participants experienc-
ing more control over the colour patch when primed
compatibly than when primed incompatibly. There was
also a trend towards a main effect of mask–target SOA
(F(1,17) = 3.38, p = 0.083), with PCE trials producing higher
control ratings than NCE trials. Importantly, the interaction
between SOA and prime–target compatibility was far from
signiﬁcance (F(1,17) = 0.43, p = 0.521) (Fig. 2, lower panel).
For comparability with the RT analysis, we also performed
post-hoc tests comparing control ratings between compati-
ble and incompatible trials in PCE (p = 0.005) and NCE
(p = 0.03) conditions. In summary, on both PCE and NCE
trials, participants experienced higher levels of control over
action effects following compatibleprime–target associations.
In addition, we found a predicted main effect of action-
effect interval (F(1,17) = 46.38, p < 0.001). Post-hoc testing
showed that participants experienced strongest sense of
control with 100 ms response-effect intervals, less control
with 300 ms, and least control with 500 ms (see Supple-
mentary Table S1). All pairwise comparisons were signiﬁ-
cant (p < 0.001). Importantly, there was no signiﬁcant
interaction between action-effect interval and compatibil-
ity (F(1,17) = 0.47, p = 0.62): thus, predictability of the ef-
fect did not differently inﬂuence sense of control across
compatible and incompatible trials. There was a trend for
a signiﬁcant interaction between action-effect interval
and SOA (F(1,17) = 2.74, p = 0.08). The three-way interac-
tion between all the factors was far from signiﬁcance
(F(1,17) = 0.04, p = 0.96).3. Experiment 2
3.1. Material and methods
3.1.1. Participants
Twelve participants (6 females and 6 males aged 22–
31 years), with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were
recruited to participate in the second experiment. The
experiment consisted of two separate, but consecutive,
tests: a PCE/NCE test (based on that presented inExperiment 1, but see below), followed by a prime discrim-
ination test. All participants provided written informed
consent and were paid €10 for their participation.
3.1.2. PCE/NCE test
3.1.2.1. Apparatus and materials. Apparatus and materials
were the same as in Experiment 1, except that neutral
primes were also included, together with left- or right-
pointing prime arrows. Neutral primes were constructed
by superimposing left- and right-oriented primes (Lingnau
& Vorberg, 2005) (see Fig. 3).
3.1.2.2. Design and procedure. On one third of the trials in
each block at random, the prime and the target were com-
patible, while on the other one third, they were incompati-
ble. In the remaining one third of the trials, the primes
were neutral. As in Experiment 1, trials were randomly di-
vided into PCE and NCE trials, by inserting (NCE) or omit-
ting (PCE) a 110 ms delay between mask and target.
The experiment consisted of six blocks of 54 trials each.
When an error occurred, the corresponding trial was re-
peated at the end of each block (up to 10 error trials per
block), ensuring that all colours were seen equally often
despite any errors. The timeline in Experiment 2 was ex-
actly the same as in the ﬁrst experiment.
3.1.2.3. Data analyses. Error rates (ERs) and response times
(RTs) were analysed independently using 2  3 repeated-
measures ANOVAs with prime–target relation (compatible
vs. incompatible vs. neutral) and mask–target SOA (PCE vs.
NCE) as within-subjects factors. Control ratings for colour
effects were analysed using a 2  3  3 repeated-measures
ANOVA with mask–target SOA, prime–target relation, and
action-effect interval (100, 300, 500 ms) as within-subjects
factors. Post-hoc Fisher tests were used to identify differ-
ences between conditions.
3.1.3. Prime discrimination test
Following the PCE/NCE experiment, each participant
additionally performed a direct assessment of prime dis-
criminability. Deﬁning criteria for non-conscious percep-
tion is fraught with debate (Erdelyi, 2004). Criteria can be
either subjective (based on self-report) or objective (based
on forced-choice performance). As our aim in this investi-
gation was to ensure the unconscious nature of our prime
stimuli, we selected the more conservative, objective crite-
rion of awareness. Furthermore, to ensure that the prime
discrimination test was a valid measure of prime percep-
tion during the PCE/NCE experiment, we matched the de-
signs of the prime discrimination and of the control task
in as many ways as possible (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006).
Thus, in the prime discrimination task, participants were
explicitly informed of the presence of a prime, and asked
to identify its direction on each trial (left or right) using a
left or right keypress. Other elements of the trial sequence
remained identical to the PCE/NCE experiment, except that
the colour effect was not presented (effect stimuli in the
main experiment were in any case independent of prime
direction). To ensure that conscious judgement of the
prime direction was not contaminated by the unconscious
activation of a motor response, participants were only
Fig. 3. Experiment 2: Schematic of trial procedure and stimuli. Example trials from the two PCE/NCE conditions with neutral primes. The experimental
design also included four other types of trials, as in Experiment 1: compatible and incompatible trials with left- or right-pointing arrow primes, and PCE/
NCE conditions (not shown). AEI: Action-effect interval.
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(Vorberg et al., 2003). The start of the reporting interval
was signalled by a 1000 Hz tone played for 150 ms. The
prime discriminability test consisted of two blocks of 54 tri-
als each. Responses to the primes were analysed using sig-
nal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) allowing us to
compute a measure of prime discriminability (d0) for each
subject and each mask–target SOA condition (PCE/NCE).3.2. Results
3.2.1. Response times
ANOVA showed no main effects of prime–target rela-
tion (F(2,22) = 0.32, p = 0.72) or mask–target SOA
(F(1,11) = 0.91, p = 0.35). There was a clear trend towards
an interaction effect between mask–target SOA (i.e., PCE
vs. NCE latencies) and prime–target relation (compatible
vs. incompatible vs. neutral) (F(2,22) = 3.00, p = 0.07)
(Fig. 4, upper panel). This interaction followed the pattern
of Experiment 1, and was explored further with post-hoc
testing. As before, on PCE trials, participants’ responses to
arrow targets following compatible primes were faster
than following incompatible primes (416 ms vs. 454 ms;
post-hoc Fisher test: p = 0.04). NCE trials again reversed
the polarity of this effect, with participants’ responses
tending to be slower for compatible than for incompatible
trials. However, the size of this effect was reduced com-
pared to Experiment 1, and it did not achieve signiﬁcance
(465 ms vs. 441 ms; post-hoc Fisher test, p = 0.19). OnPCE trials, we found a numerical effect of compatible, rela-
tive to neutral, priming, with RTs tending to be faster in
compatible trials than neutral trials (414 ms vs. 434 ms),
whereas this effect tended to reverse on NCE trials, with re-
sponses following neutral trials tending to be faster than
responses following compatible trials (438 ms vs.
461 ms). Note that these two numerical effects did how-
ever not reach signiﬁcance (PCE: p = 0.31; NCE: p = 0.16)
(see also Supplemental material, ‘‘Correlation analyses’’,
and Table S3).3.2.2. Error rates
There was no signiﬁcant main effects of prime–target
relation (F(2,22) = 0.34, p = 0.71) or mask–target SOA
(F(1,11) = 0.66, p = 0.43). The interaction effect between
mask–target SOA and prime–target relation was not signif-
icant neither (F(2,22) = 0.92, p = 0.41) (Fig. 4, middle pa-
nel). On PCE trials, a numerical effect was found that was
consistent with Experiment 1: participants made more er-
rors in incompatible than in compatible (4.63% vs. 3.97%)
and neutral trials (4.63% vs. 4.06%). The effect, however,
did not reach signiﬁcance (post-hoc Fisher test, incompat-
ible vs. compatible, p = 0.17; incompatible vs. neutral,
p = 0.22).3.2.3. Control ratings
Inspection of Fig. 4 shows that the experience of control
over action effects was highest following compatible primes,
lowest following incompatible primes, and intermediate
Fig. 4. Experiment 2: Mean response times (ms), mean error rates (%),
and mean control ratings, on compatible and incompatible and neutral
trials, for each mask–target SOA (PCE/NCE). All error bars indicate SEM.
: p < .05.
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ANOVA did not reveal any main effect of prime–target rela-
tion (F(2,22) = 0.66, p = 0.52). There was a trend towards a
main effect of mask–target SOA (F(1,11) = 3.09, p = 0.10),
with PCE trials producing higher control ratings than NCE
trials. Importantly, the interaction between SOA and
prime–target relation was far from signiﬁcance, as in
Experiment 1 (F(2,22) = 0.06, p = 0.93) (Fig. 4, lower panel).
For comparability with the RT analysis, we also performed
post-hoc tests comparing control ratings between compat-
ible and incompatible trials for PCE and NCE trials, and
found signiﬁcant differences in both conditions (PCE:
p = 0.014, NCE p = 0.029). We also compared control
ratings between neutral and compatible trials in PCE
(p = 0.33) and NCE (p = 0.63) conditions, and between neu-
tral and incompatible trials in PCE (p = 0.11) and NCE
(p = 0.076) trials as well. In summary, on both PCE and
NCE trials, participants experienced higher levels of control
over action effects following compatible prime–target
associations – consistently with the pattern of ratings
found in Experiment 1. Interestingly, compatible primingdid not signiﬁcantly boost sense of control compared to
neutral priming. However, participants tended to feel less
control when incompatibly vs. neutrally-primed on both
PCE and NCE conditions.
In addition, we again found a main effect of action-ef-
fect interval (F(2,22) = 42.55, p < 0.001). Post-hoc testing
showed that participants experienced strongest sense of
control with 100 ms response-effect intervals, less control
with 300 ms, and least control with 500 ms. All pairwise
comparisons were signiﬁcant (p < 0.001). Importantly,
there was no signiﬁcant interaction between action-effect
interval and prime–target relation (F(4,44) = 1.49,
p = 0.22): as in Experiment 1, predictability of the effect
did not differently inﬂuence sense of control across com-
patible and incompatible and neutral trials. The interaction
between action-effect interval and SOA was not signiﬁcant
(F(2,22) = 0.48, p = 0.62) nor was the three-way interaction
between all the factors (F(4,44) = 0.94, p = 0.44).3.2.4. Prime-discrimination results
Detection analyses conﬁrmed that primes were below
the threshold of awareness, with mean d0 not signiﬁcantly
different from zero (PCE, mean d0 = 0.037 ± 0.14, p = 0.38;
NCE, mean d0 = 0.043 ± 0.13, p = 0.29) and no d0 greater
than two standard deviations above the mean. Note that
these results are consistent with d0 analyses performed in
two previous studies using the same stimuli and procedure
(Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz, & Haggard, 2012;
Wenke et al., 2010).
To ensure that even slight individual variations in prime
discrimination could not account for variations in partici-
pants’ sense of control, we also used linear regressions to
explore whether individual participants’ d0 values could
be related to their control ratings in compatible and
incompatible trials of the PCE/NCE experiment. These anal-
yses did not reveal any signiﬁcant association, either on
compatible (PCE: R = 0.26, p = 0.41; NCE: R = 0.38,
p = 0.21) or incompatible trials (PCE: R = 0.06, p = 0.84;
NCE: R = 0.14, p = 0.64) (Fig. 5). Interestingly, the sign of
the regression coefﬁcients in fact indicated that partici-
pants with better prime discrimination felt less sense of
control. Therefore, prime discrimination performance
seems unlikely to explain why participants feel more con-
trol in compatible, relative to incompatible, trials.4. Discussion
Previous evidence suggested that a subjective sense of
agency arises when external events occur in close associa-
tion with an action that people perform, or simply intend
to perform (Blakemore et al., 1998; Farrer et al., 2008;
Moore & Haggard, 2008; Sato, 2009; Wegner, Sparrow, &
Winerman, 2004). Most models conclude from this evi-
dence that agency is inferred retrospectively, after an ac-
tion, on the basis of its external consequences. Our
results extend these views in two important ways. First,
across two experiments, we showed that sense of agency
is also informed by early signals generated at the moment
of action selection. Importantly, these signals were not re-
lated to anticipation of the effects of action, because the
Fig. 5. Regression analyses between prime discrimination performance (d0) and control ratings in compatible and incompatible trials of PCE and NCE
conditions. The linear regression lines are shown in red. (a) PCE trials; (b) NCE trials. The red dashed line around the regression line represents the 95%
conﬁdence interval (CI).’’ (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
1 The effects reported here could also be interpreted in terms of access to
action representations, rather than processing ﬂuency. On this view,
compatible primes would increase the «mental accessibility» of the
response, through increasing the ease with which the representation of
the response can be activated by the target (Eitam & Higgins, 2010). Easier
access might then be experienced as greater control over outcomes
following that particular response. This explanation is not incompatible
with the ﬂuency account, and indeed it is difﬁcult to choose between them
on the basis of the present data.
448 V. Chambon, P. Haggard / Cognition 125 (2012) 441–451colour-patch action effects in our experiment were equally
predictable across compatible and incompatible priming
conditions. Speciﬁcally, the colour was independent of
the direction indicated by both the subliminal prime and
the target arrow, but depended only on the compatibility
relation between the prime and the subsequent target.
Thus, the stronger experience of control when prime and
target were compatible could not be explained by the
prime directly predicting the effect. Rather it could only
be explained by the ﬂuency of action selection processing,
as manipulated by our prime–target relation. Thus, sense
of control depends on action selection signals generated
in advance of the action itself, and before action outcomes
are known (see also Wenke et al., 2010). In Experiment 2,
we included neutral primes. These produced control rat-
ings intermediate between those for compatible primes
and incompatible primes (though not statistically different
from either in this small, follow-up experiment). While
caution is required in interpreting statistically null results,
the intermediate ratings obtained with neutral primes sug-
gests that the prospective component of agency involves
both an experienced control beneﬁt for action selectionﬂuency, and a control cost for action selection dysﬂuency.
Further, adequately-powered studies might usefully assess
which of these inﬂuences is stronger.1
We further show that effects of action ﬂuency on sub-
jective control are prospective – i.e., arise during the pro-
cesses that select and generate action – and cannot be
due to participants retrospectively monitoring their own
motor performance. We used the NCE effect to reverse
the normal relationship between prime–target compatibil-
ity and RTs, but found that subjective control remained
unaffected, in two separate experiments. Thus, in compat-
ible NCE trials, participants experienced stronger control
Fig. 6. Dissociating sense of control from performance monitoring. Upper panel (a) time course of sub-threshold response activation following a right-
pointing prime that is either compatible (black) or incompatible (grey) with the upcoming target. When no additional evidence – such as a compatible
target – conﬁrms the initial prime-induced activation, it is automatically inhibited. This inhibition leads to relative facilitation of the incompatible
activation. Thus, when the target occurs, the motor activation threshold can be reached faster than in the compatible case, creating the NCE (adapted from
Sumner and Husain (2008)). (b) Two processes contributing to sense of control. Action-effect matching: Control can be retrospectively inferred from
comparing the predicted effect of a response with its actual effect using a comparator. The sense of control is inversely related to the comparator output.
Lower grey panel: In addition, sense of control depends on an early signal generated during action selection, and temporarily held in an intentional buffer, in
advance of the action itself. This signal is positively related to sense of control.
V. Chambon, P. Haggard / Cognition 125 (2012) 441–451 449despite slower response times and higher error rates, while
in incompatible NCE trials they experienced less control
despite faster RTs. Although studies using other tasks show
that people can monitor RTs to estimate their performance
(Corallo et al., 2008; Marti et al., 2010), our results suggest
that the prospective aspect of control does not depend on
such performance monitoring.
The NCE is normally considered the result of an auto-
matic, inhibitory, mechanism within the brain’s action pro-
gramming centres (Schlaghecken, Bowman, & Eimer, 2006;
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002, 2006). This auto-inhibition
occurs when no additional evidence – such as a congruent
target – provides follow-up conﬁrmation of the initial acti-
vation elicited by the prime (see Schlaghecken et al. (2007)
for a review). Interestingly, this model of premotor pro-
cessing posits a strict serial order of evidence accumula-
tion, allowing us to localise the prospective signals for
sense of control within the processing chain. Clearly, the
initial prime-induced activation of motor intentions that
causes the PCE must precede the subsequent window of
follow-up conﬁrmation that causes the NCE (Schlaghecken
et al., 2007) (see Fig. 6a, upper panel). Our data shows that
sense of control depends on initial prime-induced activa-
tion of motor intentions, but is unaffected by whether fol-
low-up conﬁrmation occurs (as in PCE) or not (as in NCE).Therefore, sense of control must depend on signals gener-
ated before the stage of the auto-inhibition process thought
to underlie the NCE.
Our data also allow a second comment on serial pro-
cessing underlying the sense of control. We showed that
prime–target compatibility and response-effect interval
both had strong effects on sense of control, but that these
effects were strictly additive, with no convincing interac-
tion between them (F < 1). By the additive factors logic
(Sternberg, 1969), prime compatibility and response-effect
intervals should therefore inﬂuence different stages in the
processes that generate sense of control. The inﬂuence of
response-effect intervals must, necessarily, be retrospec-
tive, because interval duration is known only once the col-
our effect terminates the interval. Similarly, the inﬂuence
of prime compatibility must necessarily be prospective, be-
cause prime compatibility was statistically independent of
action and colour effect in our design. Thus, while the ab-
sence of interaction must be interpreted with caution
appropriate for a null result, clear additivity of these two
factors is consistent with a dissociation between prospec-
tive and retrospective contributions to sense of control.
We suggest that the experience of control in normal cir-
cumstances represents a sum of these two independent
components.
450 V. Chambon, P. Haggard / Cognition 125 (2012) 441–451Together, our results suggest action selection processes
contribute prospectively to the sense of control. This view
is compatible with a number of models of action selection.
In one inﬂuential model, action selection involves a hierar-
chical process of generating intentions which increase in
speciﬁcity (Pacherie, 2000, 2008; see also Chambon et al.,
2011). In our case, primes provide a ﬁrst speciﬁcation of
which keypress to perform. When the subsequent target
is compatible, the process of specifying the intention is ﬂu-
ent and facilitated, relative to incompatible conditions.
Alternatively, other recent models treat intention as paral-
lel competition between alternative premotor representa-
tions (Cisek, 2007). In such models, strength of an
intention depends on how much its activation level ex-
ceeds that of alternatives. Compatible primes might in-
crease sense of control in our task either by facilitating
the processes that develop intentions, or by boosting the ﬁ-
nal activation level of an intention, or both. Importantly,
however, in both models, the sense of control depends on
processes that occur before action initiation, and makes
no reference to the effects of action. In this sense, feeling of
control is partly prospective, rather than effect-related.
We propose a model of prospective sense of control that
captures these constraints. Once an intentional code for
left or right action has been fully speciﬁed by the sublimi-
nal prime, it is transferred to temporary storage in an
‘‘intentional buffer’’ (Fig. 6b). Importantly, this intentional
buffer is not altered by the subsequent process of conﬁr-
mation, or by the auto-inhibition that occurs in the NCE.
We suggest that the prospective contribution of action
selection to sense of control arises from merely reading
out the intentional buffer, in advance of the action itself
and before the moment where NCE operates. Under normal
circumstances, the prospective feeling of control read from
the buffer would be rapidly followed by the resulting ac-
tion and the predicted effect. Only once action and effect
have occurred, can the classic mechanisms of action-effect
comparison begin. These mechanisms involve additional
retrospective processes. For example, the contents of the
intentional buffer may be compared with the action and
its external effect, resulting in the subject not feeling
responsible for the effect when a mismatch occurs (e.g.,
Farrer et al., 2008; Sato & Yasuda, 2005).
Although this is necessarily speculative, there is conver-
gent evidence suggesting the existence of such a buffer.
Computational models of motor control as applied to sense
of agency have demonstrated that computing agency re-
quires matching forward model predictions with sensory
feedback (e.g., Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001). The pre-
dictions are available instantaneously, but the sensory feed-
back is delayed. Because of this delay, the predictions made
by the forward model must be buffered until the feedback
becomes available, ensuring that thematching process uses
the correct temporal alignment. This buffer componentwas
very explicit in earlier versions of these models (e.g., Miall,
Weir, Wolpert, & Stein, 1993), though it receives less atten-
tion in more recent incarnations. In our suggestion, it is not
the outcome prediction of the forward model that is
buffered, but the processing of action selection itself (i.e.,
the so-called ‘‘inverse model’’). However, our suggestion of
buffering premotor signals is essentially similar.Interestingly, the prospective contribution of selection
ﬂuency to sense of control in our experiment is strictly illu-
sory. The relation between participant’s actual behaviour
and subsequent outcomes was the same whether primes
were compatible or not. Therefore, compatible and incom-
patible conditions did not differ in the level of actual con-
trol, in the statistical sense that action-outcome
contingency was similar for compatible and incompatible
conditions. Yet, when subjects were asked to explicitly
elaborate on how they judged control during post-experi-
ment debrieﬁng, none of them mentioned the ﬂuency, or
ease of compatibly-primed actions. Rather, most partici-
pants reported trying to focus on the colour of effects or
on action-effect intervals, and occasionally reported ‘‘mag-
ical thoughts’’ (e.g., ‘‘I though the harder I pressed the but-
ton response, the more in control I was of when the colour
patch appeared’’). Internal signals of premotor ﬂuency
might not produce a strong conscious experience with dis-
tinctive content, but might inﬂuence the experience of sur-
rounding events. Thus, ﬂuency of action selection would
not be experienced as such, but would presumably be
experienced as something that goes ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in
the control of instrumental action, and thus seems relevant
to sense of agency. However, the fact that the experience of
ﬂuent selection cannot be explicitly reported or experi-
enced, does not prevent the brain from using ﬂuency sig-
nals to form an experience of agency (Chambon et al.,
2012). In that sense, signals relating to the ﬂuency of action
selection would not be perceived for what they really are,
but (mis-)attributed to the processes of actually control-
ling the action.
The large literature on sense of agency conﬁrms that
multiple cues, including statistical contingency (Moore,
Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009), temporal contiguity (Far-
rer et al., 2008), and prior expectation (Wegner, 2002) all
contribute to sense of agency. But people seem to have rel-
atively little explicit knowledge of how they compute
agency, suggesting that this multiple cue integration pro-
cess is largely automatic. Fluency signals arising from ac-
tion selection processes may combine, at an implicit
level, with several others cues, to produce a reliable sense
of agency. In routine situations, for example, ﬂuent action
selection and control of action effects generally co-occur.
Thus, the skilled pilot immediately knows which button
in a complex cockpit must be pressed to deal with each
speciﬁc type of incident: her extensive training means that
she automatically plans a speciﬁc response appropriate to
the current situation, and knows that the aircraft will re-
spond appropriately. Outside the laboratory, ﬂuent action
selection is often a good advance predictor of actual statis-
tical control over the external environment. By separating
ﬂuency of action selection from actual control contingen-
cies, we have demonstrated the importance of this pro-
spective aspect of agency. In future research, we will
investigate whether this prospective aspect of agency is
overwritten when we actually lose control, for example if
the actual outcome of our action is not as predicted. We ex-
pect that the healthy brain successfully integrates prospec-
tive feelings of control based on action selection, and
retrospective judgements of actual control over action out-
comes. However, this integration process may fail in some
V. Chambon, P. Haggard / Cognition 125 (2012) 441–451 451circumstances, as it might be the case in psychiatric pa-
tients suffering from delusions of control.
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